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SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME:
DESCRIPTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
CONTROL MEASURES
Jorge E. Galva, J.D., M.H.A.
The University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics
Iowa City, Iowa, U.S.A.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (hereinafter SARS) is the first severe and readi ly transmissible new disease to emerge in the 21st century 1. The presence of this infec tious agent was first recognized in early November 2002 in the province of Guangdong
in the People's Republic of China. SARS rapidly spread from there to other parts of the
world, notably Southeast Asia and Canada. According to data compiled in August
2003, altogether 8,422 cases occurred in 29 countries. The most severely affected
countries were China (including the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and
Taiwan), Canada, Singapore and Vietnam, all of which experienced outbreaks before
the issue of global alerts by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 12 and 15
March, 2003. Nine hundred and eight persons died in the most affected countries,
with only eight deaths occurring in the additional 25 countries where cases were
reported.
International public health authorities took immediate steps to isolate and identify
the pathogen responsible for the atypical severe pneumonia. The coronavirus (SARS CoV) was ultimately identified as the pathogen responsible . Vigorous, even drastic,
national and international public health measures contributed to the rapid control of
the infection. On July 5, 2003, WHO announced that the last known chain of human to-human transmission of the SARS virus had been broken; this brought to an end the
initial outbreak of this new and severe respiratory disease2. International public health
organizations remain alert to the possibility of re -emergence of the virus despite the
subsidence and eventual disappearance of new infection reports.
There exist ample unknown elements to the SARS outbreak. Epidemiologists have
yet to definitely ascertain the origin of the pathogen, the precise mechanism of infection and the possible seasonality or environmental conditioners to re -emergence. Public
health authorities were able to contain the outbreak through extremely successful albeit
low-tech methods; these were greatly effective but exacted tremendous economic and
personal hardship and disruption to millions of persons. The possibility of preventive
measures such as vaccines is still remote.
The SARS outbreak is a prime example of the sudden emergence of a suspected
trans -species pathogen able to survive within the human host with extremely prejudicial
effects on human health. Careful analysis of the appearance, detection, alert and reme dial methods used to control the SARS epidemic remain of the utmost importance.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISEASE
The first known case of atypical pneumonia occurred in Foshan City, Guangdong
Province, People's Republic of China on November 16, 2002. WHO received reports
of the Chinese Ministry of Health of an outbreak in that province with 305 known
cases and five fatalities on February 11, 2003. The Chinese government informed
WHO on February 12, 2003, that the outbreak had now affected six municipalities;
tests for influenza viruses had come negative. Further investigations over the course of
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monary plague, leptospirosis and hemorrhagic fever. The Chinese public health authorities, for the first time, designated the disease as atypical pneumonia of unknown origin
On February 20, Hong Kong officials informed WHO of an outbreak of two cases
of avian influenza following the detection of A(HSNl) virus in members of a family
recently returned from Guangdong. On February 26, a foreign businessman was
admitted to the French Hospital in Hanoi, Republic of Vietnam, with a three -day history of respiratory symptoms; the patient had been on a business trip to Hong Kong.
Two days later Dr. Carlo Urbani, a WHO official based in Vietnam, was alarmed by
several cases of atypical pneumonia in the French Hospital, where he assisted as con sultant; Dr. Urbani notified the WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific.
On March 1, 2003, a former flight attendant was admitted to a hospital in
Singapore with diagnosis of respiratory syndrome of unknown origin. The flight atten dant had been on a trip to Hong Kong. Four days later, the businessman hospitalized
in Hanoi was transferred to the Princess Margaret Hospital in Hong Kong; by then,
seven health workers at the French Hospital had become ill with atypical pneumonia.
On that same day a Toronto woman returning to Canada after a trip to Hong Kong
died; five members of her family were found to be infected and were admitted for hos pital care. On March 11, Dr. Urbani departed for Bangkok for a presentation on tropi cal diseases; he was ill on arrival and was immediately hospitalized5. In the aftermath of
the epidemic, public health authorities determined that the virus spread from its original point of presumed inception in Guangdong province to the following countries or
regions (in order of detection and/or reporting): Guangdong province, Hong Kong,
Vietnam, Singapore, Germany, Canada, Hong Kong (secondary), the United States
and Ireland2:
On March 12, 2003, WHO issued a global alert about cases of severe atypical
pneumonia following mounting and increasingly alarming reports of cases among hospital staff members in Hanoi and Hong Kong. The next day WHO activated its emergency alert system, sending urgent messages to all Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN) partners. GOARN was launched in 2000 as a mechanism to link
together 112 existing networks which possessed much of the data, expertise and skills
to keep the international community abreast of outbreaks and ready to respond.
GOARN would turn out to be one of the most important instruments in combating
the rapidly spreading disease. The GOARN alert represented the first global recogni tion of the severe nature of this deadly threat. WHO was on the track of a new and
highly contagious form of pneumonia. The race to stop the disease had started .

CASE DEFINITION:
The public health response to SARS depended on the rapid development of means
to promptly identify suspect cases and differentiate these from known entities with sim ilar symptoms. In order to do this, information was rapidly shared by all WHO partners
reporting SARS and SARS-like victims . A case definition was developed several months
after the onset of the epidemic. The Centers for Disease Control ( CDC) defined a sus pect case ofSARS as a person with onset of fever (temperature >38°C [100.4°F]) and
lower respiratory tract symptoms within l O days of either travel to an area with docu mented transmission of SARS or close contact with a person believed to have SARS . A
probable cause was defined as a suspect case that also has chest radiographic findings of
pneumonia, acute respiratory distress (ARDS), or an unexplained respiratory illness
resulting in death, with autopsy findings of ARDS without identifiable cause. Suspect
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and pro bable cases were further classified based on laboratory findings as laboratory
positive, laboratory negative or indeterminate, as shown in the following table 6:
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T he rapid collection and cl assification of data during and after the epidemic subsided
has all owed the refin ement of those indicators to include furth er description of clinical,
physical, laboratory and radiographic findings7:
1. Clinical Signs and Symptoms: The median incubation period for SARS appeared to
be four to six days, with most patients becoming ill within two to 10 days after
exposure. The most common symptoms were fever, often accompanied by headache,
myalgia, malaise , chi lls and rigor. The mai n component of SARS, respiratory symp toms, typically did not begin until after two to seven days after illness onset. The
most common respiratory symptoms were lower respiratory tract symptoms, includ ing cough and dyspn ea. Gastrointestinal symptoms were reported in some cases .
2 . Physical findings : the most frequent physical findings were tachypnea, tachycardia
and hypoxemia . Although fever was common ly associated with SARS (to the exte nt
that some public buildings rapidly acq uired and installed automatic body tempera-

International Journal of Global Health and H ealth Disparities

Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2004

65

3

ture measuring
devices
at their
entries),
manyDisparities,
as 15 -44 percent
had
a normal
International
Journal
of Global
Health
and as
Health
Vol. 3, No.
1 [2004],
Art. 7
body temperature upon evaluation, eve n though other symptoms of SARS were
already present.
3. Laboratory findings: hematologic abnormalities were among the most consistent laboratory findin gs reported in SARS patients; most patients had total leukocyte counts
th at were normal or slightly low, and 70-95 percent of patients had lymphopenia.
Pl atelet counts were mildly depressed in 30-50 percent of all patients, and prolongation of the activated partial thrombopl asti n time was observed in 40 -60 percent of
patients; other common lab abnormalities included elevated lac tate dehydrogenase in
70-90 percent of patients, elevated alanin e aminotransferase levels in 20-30 percent,
and elevated creatine phosphokin ase in 30-40 percent of all patients.
4. Radiographic findings: Available data suggests that almost all reported SARS patients
with laboratory evidence of SARS -CoV infection have radiographic evidence of
pneumonia documented at some point during their illness . However, approximately
30 percent of chest X-rays may be normal at the time of first evaluation despite
onset of symptoms. Aggregated data suggested the presence of radiographic evi dence of SARS-CoV in 97 percent of all patients at day seven of onset of symptoms.
CT appeared to be a more sensitive instrument th an conventional X-rays; SARS
patients who had normal X-rays early in their clinical course ofte n had evidence of
pneumonia by CT.
5. Clinical virology: The main laboratory tests available to diagnose SARS -COV infec tion utilized by public health authorities as a response to the epidemic were RNA
detection through reverse transcriptase -polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) or real time PCR and serologic testing for antibodies against SARS-CoV8 . Despite the dis putes regarding the reliability of PCR tests for SARS-CoV detection, the clinical
means has been endorsed by other studies9. The CDC has endorsed the use of RTPCR as a me ans of detection of SARS-CoV infection . This is working definition
used by the CDClO:
A. Laboratory confirmed SARS-CoV
• Detection of any of the following by a validated test, with confirmation in a
reference laboratory:
• Serum antibodies to SARS -CoV in a single se rum specimen, or
• A four-fold increase in SARS-CoV antibody titer between acute and convalescent-phase serum specimens tested in parallel or
• Isolation in cell culture of SARS -CoV from a clinical specimen, with confirmation using a test validated by CDC or;
• Detection of SARS-CoV RNA by RT-PCR validated by CDC, with confirmation in a reference laboratory, from:
• Two clinical specimens from different sources, or
• Two clinical specimens collected from the same source on two different
days
The CDC has developed and validated an enzyme immunoassay (EIA ) for detection of
serum antibody to SARS-CoV and an RT-PCR assay for detection of SARS-CoV. The
CDC, however, considers detection of the SARS-CoV antibody the most reliable indi cator of the infection 11.
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EPIDEMIOLOGY:

Tacking the causative agent of disease and route(s) of transmission:
Despite the development of this array of indicators, detection of the SA RS-CoV
infection mainly remains in the realm of epidemiological investigation. As with other
causes of bacterial and viral pneumonia, clinical findings in patients with SARS cannot
accurately predict the causative agent. Additional refinements in the detection of the
causative agent are required to determine whether the constellation of clinical findings
alone can be used to discriminate accurately between SARS and other respiratory diseases . Many of the clinical and laboratory features of SARS are sim il ar to other forms of
viral pneumonia. This makes tracking suspect SARS cases and determining routes of
infection a complicated taskl2.
Once again the rapid public health response all owed the coll ection and dissemination
of crucial information allowing the identification of probable cases and routes of transmission . The fo ll owing information has been valid ated through repeated epidemiologi cal observation over the course of the epidemic and its aftermathl3:
I. Direct contact: the fact that the majority of new infections occurred in close contact
of patients, such as household members, healthcare workers or other patients not
protected, indicates that the virus is predominantly spread by droplets or by direct
and indirect contact. Airborne spread of SARS, however, does not seem to be a
major route of transmission, despite conflicting evidence linked to the apparent airborne transmission in the Hong Kong/Hotel Metropole infection cluster. T here are
currently no indications that any goods, products or animals arriving from areas with
SARS outbreaks pose a risk to publi c health, leading the WHO to not recommend
any restriction in animal movement from epidemic zones.
2 . Asymptomatic patients: There are few data as to asymptomatic individuals can transmit the infection . Preliminary findings suggest that developers of mild symptoms
may have the SARS-CoV antibodies without developing SARS. There is at present
no direct evidence of contagion from an asymptomatic patient.
3. Symptomatic patients: The weight of evidence suggests that only symptomatic
patients may spread the SARS virus efficiently. However, earl y evidence from
Singapore suggests that the rate of transmission, though considerable, is not explosive: 81 percent of all probable SARS cases in Singapore had no evidence of transmission of a clinicall y identifiable ill ness to other persons. In comparison with other
infectious diseases that are spread via the respiratory route, SARS seems to be mod erate ly transmissible.
4. Superspreaders: The term "supersp reading" has been used to describe situation in
which a single individual has d irectly infected a large number of other individuals. In
the Singapore epidemic, of the first 201 probable cases reported, 103 were infected
by just five source cases. The most probable explanatio n for the phenomenon of
superspreading is extensive viral shedd in g by the patients . This may be due to
advanced disease or possibly co-morbidities that result in high viral loads. However,
there is need of additional data to come to definite conclusions in order to understand why, under certain circumstances, the spread of SARS is extremely efficient.
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Vietnam and in Hospital in Hong Kong confirmed the potenti ally highly contagious
nature of the virus . Medical personnel , physicians, nurse and hospital workers are
among those commonly infected . Attack rates as high as 50 percent have been
reported. In particular, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures inside th e hospitals ,
such as diagnostic sputum induction, bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation , and
airway suction are potent aerosol generating procedures, and are now recognized as
hi gh-risk activiti es. The hi gh -risk nature of activities generating potent aerosol
potential is validated by the recently publici zed outbreak of SARS affectin g lab workers in Chinal4.
6. Transmission during quarantine : There has been at le ast one report ofSARS -CoV
transmission during qu arantine. This indicated the risk of grouping suspected SARS
cases with real SARS cases in that the uninfected individual may become infected
during the isolation and quarantine period.
7. Final observations: The SARS virus is not easily transmissible outside of certain settings . For a major local outbreak to occur there need s to be:
A. An infectious patient, and
B. A close community or "tribe," i.e., healthcare workers, military populations,
travel groups, religious gath erings or funerals, with close interactio ns .
The foregoing suggests the cruci al importance of appropriate tracking and linkage of
suspec ted and probable SARS patients, and strict preventive and remedial measures.
These will be discussed in a subsequent section of this paper.

ATTACK RATES:
Even though several estimations of SARS-CoV attack rates have been made by
public health authorities worldwide, a study published in the NEJM using cases and
controls traveling in airplanes with known SARS-infected individu als is very compelling
due to the built-in control for confounding factors. The researchers chose three different instances where airline passenge rs were found to sit at varying distances to SARSinfected patients. The researchers controlled for the infectious nature of th e index passe nge r, previous pulmonary infections in cases and controls on board and distance from
the seating place of the index patient . After one flight carrying a symptom atic person
and 119 other persons , laborator y-confirmed SARS developed in 16 persons, two oth ers were given di agnoses of probable SARS, and four were reported to have SARS but
could not be interviewed. Among the 22 persons with illness, the mean time from the
flight to the onset of symptoms was four days (range, two to eight), and there were no
recog nized exposures to pati ents with SARS before or afte r the flight. Illness in passengers was related to the physical proximity to the index patient, with illness reported in
eight of the 23 persons who were seated in the three rows in front of the index patient,
as compared with 10 of the 88 persons who were seated elsewhere ( relative risk, 3 .1;
95 percent confidence interval, 1.4 to 6.9 ). In contrast, another fli ght carrying four
symptomatic persons resulted in transmission to at most one other person , and no ill ness was documented in passe nge rs on the flight that carried a person who had pre symptomatic SARS. This, in turn, le ad to the conclusion that transmission of SARS
may occur on an aircraft when infected persons fly during the symptomatic phase of ill ness. I 5.
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METHOD(S) OF CONTROL/PREVENTION:

The CD C has iss ued the following core recommendations as key elements for control
and prevention o f SARS-CoV epidemic recurrence:

1. Comm and and control
a. Goals:
1. Determine and esta blish operational authority for a response
11. Estab lish an incid ent manage ment structure for the response to a SARS
o utbreak, suppo rted by adequate inform ation systems
n1. Determine and establish legal authority for a response to a SARS outbreak
2. Surveillance
a. Goals:
1. Max imi ze earl y detection of cases and clu ste rs of respiratory infecti o ns
that mi ght signal the global re -e mergence of SARS-CoV disease whil e
minimizing unnecessary laboratory testing, implementation of control
measures and social disruption
11. If SARS-Co V transmission recurs, maintain prompt and co mpl ete identification and reportin g of potenti al cases to facilitate ou tbreak control
and management
n1. Id enti fy and monitor contacts of cases of SA RS-CoV disease to enabl e
earl y detection of illness in persons at greatest risk
3. Prepared ness
a. Goals:
1. Rapidl y identify and isolate all potential SA RS patients
11. Impleme nt infection control practices and contact traci ng to interrup t
SARS-CoV t ransmission
n1. Ens ure rapid communication within healthcare facilities and between
healthcare fac iliti es and health departments
4. Community contai nm ent measures, including non -hospital isol atio n and quaran tine
a. Goal :
1. Prevent transmission of SARS -CoV throu g h use of a range of commu nity containm ent strate gies chose n to provide maximum efficacy based
o n the characteristics of the o utbreak while minimi zin g the adverse
impacts o n civil liber ti es
5. Prevention of international travel -re lated transmission risk
a. Goals:
1. Preve nt the introduction ofSARS -CoV (and spread fro m an introduc tion ) into the United States from SARS-affected areas
11. Preve nt exportation of SARS -CoV from th e U nited States if domestic
t ransmi ssio n prese nts and increased risk of exportation
n1. Red uce the risk ofSARS-CoV disease among o utbound travelers to
SARS-affec ted areas
1v. Prevent the transm ission of SA RS -CoV to passe nge rs o n a conveyance
with a SARS patient, and evalu ate and mo nito r o ther passengers to
detect SARS-like illness and prevent further spread
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a. Goals:
i. Provide the public health community with ready access to high -quality
SARS-CoV diagnostics
11. Ensure that SARS -CoV laboratory diagnostics are used safely and
appropriately and that results are interpreted correctly
7. Communication and Education
a. Goals:
i. Instill and maintain public confidence in the nation's public health system
11. Contribute to the maintenance of order, minimization of public panic
and fear and facilitation of public protection
111. Provide acrnrate, timely and comprehensive information about the
SARS-Co V epidemic and disease
1v. Address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible,
and prevent stigmatization of specific groups
8. Infection control in healthcare, home and community settings
a. Goals:
i. Ensure early recognition of patients at risk for SARS-CoV disease
ii . Prevent transmission of SARS -CoV by implementing appropriate infection control precautions
9. Information technology
a. Goal :
i. Deploy an integrated data management system that efficiently and
effectivel y supports SARS outbreak response needs at the federal , state
and local levels.
These basic measures have been widely disseminated by the CDC and WHO as an elementary template for the prompt detection and containment of SARS -CoV.

PUBLIC HEALTH LAW OBSERVATIONS:
An epidemic involving SARS-CoV in the United States will test the limits of the
public health legal infrastructure. The eventuation of an epidemic of major proportions
would force public health authorities to utilize all legal means at their disposal to con trol and contain the epidemic.
This possibility raises serious questions that must be properly answered in order to
prevent unnecessary loss of life, economic activity and social interaction . Two solutions
have been proposed: one is encompassed by the MSEHPA17, the other by the defenders of a more traditional approach to the application of state police power as the proper
means to deal with such an emergency 18 . The discussion revolving around these two
differing proposals is far from theoretical. The MSEHPA proposes a balanced approach
to infection control including comprehensive legal protection to individuals, including
court hearings to contest isolation and quarantine orders. This may result inadequate
to properly control, track and detain potential spreaders. The traditional police power
approach, on the other hand, offers a much more flexible response capability, which
may be hampered by antiquated laws and judicial interference with administrative activities.
A prompt response to this legal debate is needed. Public health law will be an
indispensabl e component of a truly effective public health response to SARS.

70

International Journal of Global Health and H ealth Disparities

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/ijghhd/vol3/iss1/7

8

Galva: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome : Description, Epidemiology, an

CONCLUSION:

A recent controlled outbreak of SARS highlights the critical importance of main tainin g a vigilant attitude towards this disease . Massive med ia have, unfortunately,
done a poor job in properly illustrating the proper scope of the disease and the risks
associated with it.
Concerned governments must develop prophylactic plans to educate and sensitize
the popu lation at large about the contagious routes, symptoms and risks of SARS. The
almost automatic reappearance of facemasks in C hina upon preliminary suggestions of a
renewed epidemic is a hallmark of an aware popu latio n . Such measures must be
strengthened and amp lified until such time as more reliable markers of the disease are
developed and/or an effective vaccine is produced for those popu lations at risk for the
disease.
1

World Health Organization (WHO) (2003). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS ): Status of the Outbreak and lessons for the immediate future. WHO
Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, Geneva, 20 May 2003

2

WHO (2003 ). Consensus document on the epidem io logy of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS ). Department of Comm unicable Disease, Surveilla nce and
Response , SARS Working Group, 16-17 M ay 2003

3

WHO (2 004 ). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS ): Report by the
Secretariat. Executive Board, 113th Session, Agenda Item 8.3, 23 January 2004

4

Ibidem .

5

Sampathkumar, P., Zelalem, T., Smith, T.F., Thompson, R.L. (2003 ). SARS:
Epidemiology, Clinical Presentation, Management, and Infection Control
Measures. Mayo Clini cal Proceedings; 78:882-890

6

Ibidem

7

Jernigan, J.A .; Low, D.E.; Helfand, R.F (2004). Combinin g C li nical and
Epidemiological Features for Ea rly Recognition of SARS . Emerging Infectious
Diseases; 10 (2):3 27 -332.

8

Ibidem

9

La Montagne, J .R., Simonsen, L., Taylor, R.J ., Turnbu ll , J ., and the SARS
Working Group Co-Chairs (2004 ). Severe Respiratory Syndrome: Developing a
Research Response. Journal of Infectious Diseases; 189:634 -41.

l O Center for Disease Control. Fact Sheet for C lini cians: Interpreting SA RS -Co V
Results from CDC and other Public Health Laboratories [Laboratory Guidance]
2004 Jan ( cited Apri l 29 2004 ). Available at:
www.publichealth.va.gov/sars/Lab / clinicians_fs .pdf

11 Ibidem .

International Journal of Global H ealth and H ealth Disparities

Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2004

71

9

12International
Hsu L.Y., Lee
C.C.,
Ang
Patton
N.I ., LeeVol.
L.,3,etNo.
al 1(2003).
Journal
of Green
Global J.A.,
Health
andB.,
Health
Disparities,
[2004], Severe
Art. 7
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Singapore: clinical features of index patient
and initial contacts. Emerging Infectious Diseases; 9 :713 -7
13 Kamps, B.S ., Hoffman, C. SARSRefere nce [compilation] 2003 Oct (cited April 28
2004 ) Avai lable at: http://sarsreference.com/sarsref/ trans.htm
14 WHO . Addition al patients in Chi na under investigation for SARS; WHO team
travels to Beijing - update 2 [Disease Outbreak News] 2004 Apr (cited April 28
2004 ) Avai lable at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/ 2004_04_26/e n/
15 Olsen SJ, Hsiao -Ling C hang, HL, Cheung, TYY, Tang, AFY, Fisk, TLM.D., Ooi,
SPL, et al. (2003 ). Transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on
Aircraft. NEJM; 349:2416-2422
16 CDC. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Core Document [Public Guidance]
2004 Jan (cited April 29 2004 ). Available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/ ncidod/sa rs/guidance/core/ pdf/core.pdf
17 Gostin, L., Hodges, J. Public Health Emergencies and Lega l Reform : Implications
for Public Health Policy and Practice. Public Health Reports 2003; 118:477-479
18 Richards , E.P., Rathburn, K.C. (2004 ). Making State Public Health Laws Work for
SARS outbreaks. Emerging Infectious Diseases; 10 (2 ), 356-357

72

International Journal of Global H ealth and H ealth Disparities

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/ijghhd/vol3/iss1/7

10

